Characteristics of boards of directors in Vietnamese commercial banks: Current situation and policy implications

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Characteristics of boards of directors in Vietnamese commercial banks: Current situation and policy implications

Tác giả

Bùi Thị Thu Hằng

Tóm tắt



In the context of Vietnamese commercial banks gradually implementing Basel II/III, the quality of corporate governance - particularly the role of the board of directors (BOD) - has become increasingly important. This study examines the characteristics of BODs in 29 commercial banks from 2012 to 2023, using bank-level averages. The analysis combines descriptive statistics with Welch’s two-sample t-tests and effect size estimation (Hedges’ g) to evaluate both the statistical and economic significance of differences across commercial bank groups by ownership type and asset size. The results indicate that although Vietnamese commercial banks broadly comply with domestic legal requirements, their BODs remain below international benchmarks: board size remains close to the statutory minimum, chairperson–Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality persists, female and independent representation is modest, and foreign membership is rare. Educational attainment is relatively high, while the average board age reflects a mid-career profile, suggesting a balance between experience and innovation. Statistically significant differences are observed in board size and education (state-owned and large commercial banks outperform joint-stock and small commercial banks). In contrast, other attributes (independence, gender, foreign representation, board meeting frequency, and age) display only descriptive or marginal variation. These findings underscore the heterogeneity of governance practices and highlight the need for reforms to strengthen the independence, diversity, and internationalization of BODs.




Article Details

Chuyên mục
Khoa học Xã hội & Nhân văn
Tiểu sử Tác giả

Bùi Thị Thu Hằng

Khoa Kinh tế, Trường Đại học Tây Nguyên;
Tác giả liên hệ: Bùi Thị Thu Hằng; Email: btthang@ttn.edu.vn.

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